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There have been changes in the way that NICE evaluates medical treatments 
for patients who are in the last stages of their lives. If medicines fulfil some 
criteria to be considered “end of life” NICE considers if QALYs gained under 
these circumstances should receive an extra weight. In this paper we provide 
evidence about the social support that this policy may have. We present the 
result of three surveys conducted in the Spanish general population (n=813). 
Survey 1 compared increases in life expectancy for patients at the end of 
their lives with health gains from temporary health problems. Survey 2 
compared health gains for temporary health problems with health gains from 
end of life palliative care. Survey 3 compared increases in life expectancy 
with palliative care in both cases for end of life patients. Preferences were 
elicited with Person Trade-Off and Willingness to pay techniques. Our results 
suggest that QALYs for end of life treatments have a higher social value than 
for temporary health problems. However, we also find that people 
discriminate between different ways of health gains within End of Life 
treatment. People seem to attach a greater weight to palliative care than to 
life extension. 
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There is a renewed interest in the literature in the area of QALY weights. One 
of the reasons for this is the decision by the UK government to introduce 
Value-Based Pricing (Department of Health, Medicines, Pharmacy & Industry 
Group, 2010) for medicines in 2014. It has been stated (Department of Health, 
Medicines, Pharmacy & Industry Group, 2011) that “QALY measures may not 
capture all aspects of the value society gains from new treatments…The 
Government is proposing to calculate ‘QALY weights’” (p.24). Cancer care 
seems a clear candidate for the introduction of ‘QALY weights’. In fact, in a 
public consultation about the value of End-of-Life (EoL) medicines NICE (2008) 
asked if it should “place additional weight on proven survival benefits in 
patients with terminal illness and short life expectancy”. A significant 
majority (63%) of those who responded to the consultation document backed 
this proposal. Following this consultation, NICE (2009a) established that, if 
medicines fulfil some criteria they will be regarded as “end of life” and the 
Appraisal Committee will consider “the impact of giving greater weight to 
QALYs achieved in the later stages of terminal diseases” and “the magnitude 
of the additional weight”. 
 
There has been much debate about the potential extra weight that QALYs 
should receive in the case of end of life treatments  (Towse, 2009)  (Raftery, 
2009)  (IOM [Institute of Medicine] 2009)  (Maynard & Bloor, 2009). Most of the 
arguments are based on normative judgments. However, there is very little 
empirical evidence on whether this decision is, or is not, based on social 
preferences.  
 
There is some evidence about how doctors and health care professionals 
perceive the value of cancer drugs.  Morris & Perez, (2000) interviewed 
convenient groups of managers, hospital doctors and nurses about the 
monetary value of a new cancer treatment. They were asked about both their 









and social (how much the health system should pay) Willingness To Pay (WTP). 
On average, doctors were willing to pay more than members of the other two 
groups, in both respects.  Nadler, Eckert, & Neumann (2006) interviewed 90 
academic medical oncologists. They were asked to identify the minimum 
survival benefit offered by a new hypothetical medication with a marginal 
cost of $70,000 per patient at which they would be prepared to prescribe the 
new medication. Most doctors (60%) thought that increasing life expectancy 
by 4 months was enough to justify spending $70,000 per patient. Finally,   
Nadler, Broderick, Zarotsky, & Kim (2009) interviewed 50 health care 
professionals about their perceptions of the value of three new cancer 
therapies (bevacizumab, erlonitib, sunitinib). The monetary value of the QALY 
implied in their responses was approximately $170,000 per QALY gained. All 
these results apparently show that US health care professionals have a much 
higher threshold in their minds than the one used by NICE.  
 
The only study that we are aware of that has been conducted among the 
general population about this issue has been the EuroVaQ project  (Donaldson, 
2010). EuroVaQ was funded by the European Commission to derive a monetary 
value of a QALY based on surveys of the general public. A total of 17,657 
subjects responded to an internet based survey. The study was not mainly 
devised to evaluate end of life issues but it included one question about the 
value of QALYs at the end of life. The study shows that the monetary value of 
a  Q A L Y  i s  m u c h  h i g h e r  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  r i s k  r e d u c t i o n s  t h a n  i n  t h e  E o L  
context. However, it is believed that this result is problematic because the 
context (risk vs. riskless) is a factor of confusion. More specifically, there is 
evidence in the literature that WTP is not very sensitive to the size of risk 
reductions. The question about the monetary value of the QALY in the EoL 
case was asked under certainty, and this may have produced a value of the 
QALY for EoL that was lower than risk reductions.  
 
This paper offers new evidence on social perceptions about the value of EoL 
treatments. The objective was to determine if members of the general 









of terminal diseases. The study attempts to respond to several questions: 1) 
Do treatments that extend life at the EoL have more social value than 
treatments that improve quality of life for temporary health problems? 2) Do 
treatments that improve quality of life at the EoL have more social value than 
treatments that improve quality of life for temporary health problems? That 
is, do EoL treatments have more social value than treatments for temporary 
problems even if they do not extend life? 3) Do people discriminate between 
different ways of obtaining QALYs (gains in life expectancy vs. gains in quality 
of life) within EoL treatments? This question deals with the value of palliative 
vs. life extending care. In fact, in their Supplementary Advice to the 2008 
“Guide to the Methods of Technology Appraisal” NICE (2009a) contemplated 
the possibility of giving weights to QALYs only for EoL life extending 
treatments but not for EoL palliative care. This is understandable, as life 
extension is the (potential) main benefits of new cancer drugs. However, if it 
is shown that it is the presence of death per se (and not life extension at the 
end of life) that gives EoL QALYs an extra weight then EoL palliative care 
would also be a candidate for this extra weight.  
 
This paper gives the results of three surveys that attempted to respond to 
each of the above questions. It was found that members of the general 
population clearly want to give an extra weight to EoL treatments. It was also 
found that subjects seem to attach a greater value to palliative care than to 







Extensive piloting preceded the surveys. After some informal piloting with 
colleagues and university staff, a face-to-face pilot study (n=120) was 
conducted in order to test several issues such as the framing of questions, the 









different surveys were conducted using a face-to-face computer-assisted 
personal interview (CAPI) method. The random route method was followed in 
order to choose the households to be interviewed. Interviewers selected 
subjects according to age and sex quotas representative of the adult Spanish 
population. The surveys took place in the South of Spain, over a period of six 
months (May to November, 2010). 
 
Each survey was designed to test a different hypothesis. Survey 1 (n=240) 
compared the value of a health gain achieved through an improvement in 
quality of life of a temporary health state (T-QoL) with the value of a health 
gain achieved through an improvement in life expectancy at the end of life 
(EoL-LE). Survey 2 (n=232) compared the temporary health gain (T-QoL) used 
in Survey 1 with a health gain at the end of life that was achieved by 
palliative care (EoL-QoL). In Survey 2, both treatments only improved quality 
of life without affecting life expectancy. Survey 3 (n=348) included the two 
EoL scenarios used in Surveys 2 and 3 in order to directly compare the two EoL 
treatments (EoL-LE vs. EoL-QoL). It could be thought that these two 
treatments were already being compared, as in Surveys 1 and 2 they were 
both compared with T-QoL. However, there is psychological evidence 
(Loomes, 2010; Shafir, Osherson, & Smith, 1989) showing that comparing two 
objects A and B indirectly by means of a third object C is not always the same 




Six different scenarios were used in the survey (Table 1). They corresponded 
to 3 types of health gains (Temporary, Life Extending, and Palliative) and two 
different durations of benefits (6 and 18 months). Different durations were 
used for two reasons. First, to test if the potential weight for end of life 
treatments changed with the size of the health gain. For example, some 
people may give a relatively higher value to extending life as the gain 
increases. The second reason was to test the consistency of the answers, e.g. 









defined as a “percentage”. Respondents were told that 100% was normal 
health for somebody of his/her age and 0% a very bad condition, as bad as 
death. This way of presenting quality of life has been used in the literature  
(Dolan & Tsuchiya, 2009) (Baker et al., 2010).  
In all the scenarios, individuals were asked to imagine that they had been 
diagnosed with a certain illness and that a treatment increased the chances of 
improving their condition by 10%. A low probability of improvement was used 
for two reasons. One was to reduce the anxiety that a 100% chance of 
recovery could generate especially in the case of EoL-LE treatments. In 
piloting, interviewers suggested that some subjects had problems with this 
question as it sounded like “pay or die”. The second reason was that a 100% 
chance of success would imply very large health gains (e.g. almost 1 QALY in 
the case of the 18 months duration) and it was desired to avoid hitting budget 
restrictions in WTP questions. Budget restrictions produce insensitivities in 
WTP responses. It can be easily checked that in Scenarios 1, 3 and 5 the 
health gain was equivalent to 0.025 QALYs while in Scenarios 2, 4 and 6 it was 
0.075 QALYs. All the scenarios were illustrated using visual aids such as those 








2.3. Elicitation procedures 
 
Two sorts of questions were asked in order to elicit preferences: Willingness 
to Pay (WTP) and Person Trade-Off (PTO). These two methods were used in 
order to obtain preferences from an individual and a social point of view. WTP 
is a well grounded methodology in Welfare Economics and it is used in several 
parts of the public sector in order to take regulatory or investment decisions. 









preference in a public health system. It is argued that since a public health 
system has a closed budget, the relevant issue is not how much subjects are 
WTP but the opportunity costs of funding new treatments. Moreover social 
decisions incorporate an equity element that is absent in WTP. For this 
reason, PTO has been proposed as an alternative method to elicit preferences 
in the health care sector  (Nord, et al 1999).	 
 
In order to elicit WTP, a payment ladder containing a very wide range of sums 
of money was used (5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 300, 500, 700, 1000, 1500, 2000, 
2500, 3000, 4000, 5000, 7000, 10000, 25,000, and more than 25,000 euros). 
Subjects saw these amounts of money on the computer screen. They had to 
state if they would pay each of these amounts or not. This produced an 
interval where WTP was located. The subject was then asked to state their 
maximum WTP within the interval. 
 
In PTO questions people were asked to choose between two patients (A or B) 
according to the type of health gain. If the subject chose patient A, the next 
question was whether they preferred two patients like B or one patient like A. 
If they still preferred 1A to 2B, the number of B’s was increased (3, 4, 5, 10, 
15, 20, 30, 50, 100, 5000, 1000, and more than 1000) until the subject 
changed their choice. Again, an interval was produced where indifference was 
located. The subject was asked to state the number of patients of one type 
that was equivalent to 1 patient of their more preferred type.  
 
2.4. Structure of the questionnaires 
 
The three surveys had a similar structure (see Table 2). They started with a 
short description of the motives behind the study. The following paragraphs 
tried to explain the concept of quality of life as a percentage. After this 
introduction, preference questions were structured in three blocks. In each of 
the three surveys, the first block included two WTP questions, the second 
block contained the PTO questions, and finally two more WTP questions were 









socio-demographic questions. A final question was asked about the degree of 




2.5. Analysis of the data 
 
There is not a clear way of aggregating PTO responses. The two methods 
applied in Baker et al., (2010)	 were	 used which had been shown to have 
desirable theoretical properties. They are dubbed the “ratio of means” and 
the “median of ratios”: 
 
  Ratio of means 
 
This procedure assigns a value of 1 to the most preferred type of patient and 
a value of 1/Ni to the other patient, where Ni is the number of patients of the 
least preferred type that are equivalent to 1 patient of the most preferred 
type. For example, if 1A=10B then 1/Ni=0.1. The average of these values is 
estimated for each type of health gain and the ratio of these averages is the 
aggregate measure of preference. That is, let the relative value of each type 
of patient be V(.). Assume the sample is split between those (say type i 
subjects) that prefer 1A to 1B and those (say type j subjects) that have the 
opposite preferences. For type i subjects Vi(A)=1 and Vi(B)=1/NB. For type j 
subjects Vj(B)=1 and Vj(A)=1/NA. Next, the means V(A) and V(B) are calculated 
[V(.)≤1]. The measure of central tendency would be: 
 
Ratio of means = 
mean V( A)
mean V( B)
 or mean V(B)
mean V(A)
                (1) 
 
  Median of ratios 
 
In this procedure, firstly one option (A or B) is chosen as the base (the 









A is the base option. Also assume a subject for whom 1A=NB. Then Vi(A)=NB. 
Assume a subject with opposite preferences. Then Vj(A)=1/NA. The measure of 
central tendency is the median of V(A). As in the ratio of means procedure, 
this measure is symmetrical, that is, the median of V(A) is the inverse of the 
median of V(B). 
 
In the case of WTP the mean is the theoretically correct value. However, it 
was thought it could be useful to analyse WTP data using “ratio of means” and 
“median of ratios” methods. In this way WTP and PTO results can be 
compared more directly. For WTP data these methods were applied as 
follows: 
 
  Ratio of means 
 
If WTP(A)>WTP(B) then V(A)=1 and  . If WTP(B)>WTP(A) then 
V(B)=1 and  . If WTP(A)=WTP(B) then V(A)=V(B)=1. Once V(A) 
and V(B) are calculated for each subject, the ratio of means is estimated as 
with PTO.  
 
  Median of ratios:  
 
Firstly, A or B is chosen as the base. Assume it is A. Then   . 
Then the V(A) is estimated for each subject and the median is calculated.  
 
3. Results  
 












Socio-demographic characteristics of the samples can be seen in Table 3. 
Seven subjects were excluded as they were not willing to pay anything in any 
of the four WTP questions. The reason given was “the government should 
provide all these treatments free of charge”. This was interpreted as a 
protest response. The final number of observations was then 813. Samples 
were representative of the Spanish adult general population in terms of age 
and sex. Differences in socio-demographic characteristics between samples 
are not very relevant in this case since all the hypotheses are tested within 
each sample. 
 
3.2. WTP results 
 
Results of WTP questions can be seen in Table 4. In all six cases WTP for the 
18 months scenario is higher than for the 6 months scenario (differences 





1.  WTP for EoL-LE treatments is higher than for T-QoL treatments. 
 
However, the percentage of people that were not willing to pay 
anything was higher for EoL-LE than for T-QoL treatments. The basic 
reason they gave was that the health gain was insufficient. The fact 
that average WTP is higher for EoL-LE treatments than for T-QoL 
treatments, in spite of the existence of more people with zero WTP for 
EoL-LE, implies that society is split into two very different groups. One 
group think that a 6 month (even 18 month) increase in LE is not long 
enough in order to spend any money on it. However, those who give a 
positive value to life extending treatments are willing to pay 
substantially more for EoL-LE treatments than for T-QoL treatments.  
 










Improving quality of life at the end of life (Palliative care) was 
considered more important than improving quality of life for 
Temporary health problems. The issue of zero WTP was much less 
relevant in Palliative care with respect to Life Extending treatments. If 
the results of Surveys 1 and 2 are combined, it looks as if EoL-P 
receives an even higher weight than EoL-LE treatments since 
differences between each of these options and T-QoL are bigger for 
EoL-P than for EoL-LE. 
 
 
3.  WTP for EoL-P treatments is higher than for T-QoL treatments. 
 
The third survey confirmed that EoL-P treatments receive a higher 
social value than EoL-LE. This is considered to be a highly relevant 
result as it suggests that NICE End of Life criteria should also be applied 




3.3. PTO results 
 
The picture that emerges from the analysis of PTO data is very similar to that 
from WTP, at least at the ordinal level. The summary of these results can be 




1.  It is confirmed that EoL-LE treatments receive an extra weight in 
relation to Temporary health problems. More people chose the EoL-LE 
over the Temporary patient, as was the case with WTP. If WTP and PTO 
are compared using the same methodology (“ratio of means” and 









given by both methods is not very different. For PTO the ratios move 
between 1.14-1.5 and for WTP between 1.3-2.0. In both methods ratios 
increase with duration, implying that EoL-LE becomes more attractive 
in relation to Temporary health gains when life expectancy increases.  
 
 
2.  It is confirmed that EoL-P treatments receive extra weight in relation 
to Temporary health problems. However, the ratios are more extreme 
with PTO than with WTP. The ratio of means is around 3.30 in PTO and 
around 1.8 in WTP. The median of ratios with PTO (18.0 and 15.0 for 
the six months and 18 months durations, respectively) is clearly way 
out of any ratio produced by WTP. These higher ratios between EoL-P 
and T-QoL than between EoL-P and T-QoL would suggest (as in WTP) 
that EoL-P treatments receive a higher social value than EoL-LE 
treatments. 
 
3.  It is confirmed that EoL-P receives higher weight than EoL-LE when 
both contexts are compared directly. However, the ratios obtained 
with the direct comparisons are much smaller than what could be 
expected from the ratios obtained in Surveys 1 and 2. This shows the 




The picture appears to be (and is considered  to be) quite consistent. 
However, this does not imply that the subjects did not face problems in 
responding to the questions. The analysis of the responses to the last question 
of the survey revealed that two thirds of the respondents found the questions 
“difficult” or “very difficult”. This may explain some of the inconsistencies 
observed at the individual level. For example, in WTP questions many people 
gave the same answer irrespective of the duration of health gains (6 vs. 18 









problem scenario, in 41.8% of the subjects valuing the Life Extending 




Another type of inconsistency emerges when WTP and PTO responses are 
compared at an individual level. As can be seen in Table 6, there were people 
who favoured one option in PTO but they were willing to pay less for this 
option. It could be argued that this does not represent an inconsistency since 
the perspectives were different (individual vs. social). It is accepted that 
social preferences can incorporate considerations that are not included in 
individual WTP questions, and that this can lead to a change in preferences 
between WTP and PTO. However, it is suggested that another (and 
complementary) explanation of these “inconsistencies” is imprecision and 
error. It is not strange to assume that responses to such questions can be 
subject to some degree of error. This is perfectly possible given that these 
kinds of questions are complicated and preferences can be imprecise. One of 
the reasons to think in error as another explanation of the reversals between 
WTP and PTO in the results is that they were not random. Those subjects who 
were in the “minority” in PTO or in WTP (Option A in both cases) produced 
more inconsistencies. For example, in Surveys 1 and 2 the less preferred 
option is the Temporary health problem. In Survey 3, the less preferred option 
is EoL-LE. Concentrating on the choices when the duration is 6 months (for 18 
months the picture is basically the same), if those who chose Option A in 
Survey 1 (n=107), in Survey 2 (n=40) and in Survey 3 (n=124) are added, this 
gives a total of 271 subjects choosing option A (the minority option). Of those 
subjects, a total of 108 (39.9%) reversed their preferences in WTP, that is, 
they were willing to pay more for Option B. However, among those who chose 
Option B (the majority option) in PTO (n=542) only 14.8% reversed their 
preferences in WTP. It is the same with WTP. A total of 175 were willing to 
pay more for Option A and 459 were willing to pay more for Option B. Among 
those who were prepared to pay more for Option A (the minority option), 80 









of those subjects who were willing to pay more for Option B (the majority 
option). It is thought that these reversals would have been similar in both 
groups (majority and minority), if the explanation of the discrepancy between 
WTP and PTO were some kind of discrepancy between individual and social 
values. There is no reason to think that individual and social preferences are 
more different in one group than in the other. However, asymmetry is 
justified if it is assumed that preferences are stochastic, that is, subject to 
error/noise, given the difficulty of the task. An illustration of this effect is 
presented in the Appendix. If the interpretation is correct, the ratios of the 






The evidence that this paper presents suggests that: a) QALYs gained at the 
end of life receive a greater weight than QALYs gained from alleviating 
Temporary health problems, and b) Palliative care receives even greater 
weight than (short) life extensions at the end of life. It thus seems that the 
main reason for the extra weight of End of Life treatments is not only that 
QALYs obtained from quality of life improvements are different from QALYs 
obtained from increasing life expectancy, as has been suggested in the 
literature  (Mason, Jones-Lee, & Donaldson, 2009). The reason that justifies 
this extra weight seems to be related to the presence of death itself. 
Apparently, the message of this paper is that people give an extra value to 
what can be done (life extending or not) for patients that are in the last 
stages of their lives. 
 
What are the consequences for health policy? First, the fact that NICE has 
approved some EoL medicines  (NICE, 2009b) with an extra weight of 1.6 for 
EoL QALYs does not seem unreasonable according to our results. Sunitinib was 
approved at a cost per QALY of about £50,000 (NICE 2009b) representing an 









what our data cannot say is whether the threshold itself is reasonable or not. 
What our data suggest is that the extra weight is reasonable but it does not 
follow from this that the threshold used (£50,000 per QALY) is acceptable. 
The reason is that if treatments that give less QALYs per monetary unit are 
approved, treatments that are at the margin will not receive funding and a 
lower cost per QALY will be needed (within a fixed budget). This will reduce 
the threshold and the weight of EoL treatments will have to be estimated in 
relation to this new threshold. 
 
Another consequence is that NICE may have to change some of its methods in 
order to evaluate drugs that are used in EoL situations. NICE supplementary 
advice on EoL states that it is “technically more accurate….to include only 
the QALYs gained through extension of life and not the QALYs gained through 
improved quality of life during any extended  ‘progression free’ period”. Our 
study suggests that this is not correct. If anything, QALYs gained through 
improvements in Quality of Life should receive a higher weight. Cancer drugs 
could receive a premium if they reduce toxicity even if they do not extend 
life. If this is the case, quality of life measurement is of paramount 
importance in the evaluation of cancer drugs. This requires a more stringent 
set of rules in order to incorporate quality of life into economic evaluations. 
While NICE has been very demanding in the evidence that relates to life 
extension, we think that it has accepted weaker evidence in relation to 
quality of life. In some cases (2010a) the trial did not include quality of life 
data and the economic evaluation adapts utilities used in patients with a 
different type of cancer. In other cases (2010b) utilities come from nurses and 
clinicians. Indirect methods such as “mapping” were also used (2010c). It is 
also surprising that utilities are allocated to very vague health states such as 
“progress-free survival”, “stable disease” or “progressive disease”. In 
summary, whilst NICE has rejected several drugs based on lack of evidence 
about the effect of the drug on life expectancy, it seems that quality of life 
has played no relevant role in these decisions. Apparently this is not exclusive 
to evaluations conducted by NICE. Tengs (2004) reviewed 110 evaluations of 









difference in resource allocation decisions. This is really surprising since we 
are dealing with treatments with serious side effects. Garau et al. (2011) have 
suggested that this result can be explained by limitations in the QALY model 
(e.g. failure of the constant proportional trade-off assumption) or, at least, in 
the way that quality of life is measured (e.g. using an instrument, such as the 
Euroqol, that may not be sensitive enough). Our results suggest that stronger 
evidence is needed on quality of life when evaluating cancer drugs.  
 
One issue that can be raised is to what extent a survey like this one can 
produce results that are normative from a social policy point of view. We 
think that surveys in general, and this one in particular, have limitations from 
a normative point of view. Some of them are discussed below. 
 
This survey asked questions that are very unfamiliar and emotional. If we put 
these two things together (emotions and unfamiliarity) responses can be 
driven by factors (biases) that are not normatively desirable, as the literature 
on affect has shown (Slovic, 2007) (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 
2000). For this reason, it is important to be able to justify empirical results 
with a normative theory. Cookson (2011) suggests that concern for the worst-
off (severity) can provide a normative justification for giving extra-weight to 
QALYs gained at the end of life. However, this does not mean that subjects’ 
responses are only driven by severity concerns and have normative validity. 
There may be an emotional component behind the weight for EoL treatments 
driven by the presence of near death. We are not sure to what extent talking 
about near death issue raises emotions that may not be normatively desirable 
to guide social policy. Take, for example, the result that Palliative Care is 
strongly favoured by the population. Does this imply that alleviating pain at 
the End of Life is more important than alleviating the same degree of pain 
after an operation for a temporary health problem? We are not sure to what 
extent our results can be interpreted in this way.  
 
We also have concerns about the influence of framing effects on our results. 









preferences  (Ubel, Baron, & Asch, 2001). For example, we are not sure to 
what extent using percentages as a way of illustrating quality of life may have 
affected our results. This method has been used in the literature  (Dolan & 
Tsuchiya, 2009)  (Baker et al., 2010) and it has been shown to produce 
consistent results. However, it would be interesting in future research to see 
what would happen if quality of life were described in a less abstract manner 
(e.g. symptoms). Our results should be confirmed by other research using 
different methods and different framing. However, the fact that we have 
similar results with two different methods and in three different and 
independent samples suggests that there is something special about health 
gains at the end of life that is not captured by the assumption that all QALYs 
are created equal. 
 
A final issue related to our results is opportunity costs. The paper suggests 
that people may want to give extra-weight to treatments that benefit 
patients with a terminal illness. One criticism could be that subjects are not 
aware of the opportunity costs that this policy involves. More resources for 
end of life problems mean fewer resources for other health problems. To 
what extent have the methods used in this survey allowed people to think 
about this problem? Our survey used two methods that required subjects to 
take into account opportunity costs in one way or another. In WTP questions 
people have shown that they prefer to spend their own money (and this has 
clear opportunity costs) on end of life treatments rather than on temporary 
health problems. If we go to PTO questions, opportunity costs are very clear. 
Of course, there could be better ways of showing subjects the consequences 
of giving extra weight to EoL health gains. For example, people could be 
asked to choose where to disinvest if more weight is given to EoL health gains. 
Maybe this framing can help people to perceive opportunity costs more 
clearly. The role of opportunity costs should be the object of future research.  
 
In summary, we have shown that the decision of giving extra weight to QALYs 
gained at the end of life may be supported by the general population. Our 









obtained by increasing life expectancy are more valued than those obtained 
by improving quality of life. We show that quality of life at the end of life can 
be even more important than life extension. This has consequences for the 
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Figure 1. Example of a visual aid for WTP questions: 
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Figure 2. Example of a visual aid for PTO questions: 


























































Table 1. Scenarios used in the surveys. 
	
  Without treatment  With treatment if successful (10% 
chance of success)  QALY Health gain 
Scenario 1. End of life, life 
extending treatment (EoL-LE), 6 
months. 
Life expectancy: 3 months 
Quality of life: 50% of normal health 
Life expectancy: 9 months 
Quality of life: 50% of normal health 
10% chance of 6 months life 
extension at 50% (0.025 QALY) 
Scenario 2. End of life, life 
extending treatment (EoL-LE), 
18 months. 
Life expectancy: 3 months 
Quality of life: 50% of normal health 
Life expectancy: 21 months 
Quality of life: 50% of normal health 
10% chance of 6 months life 
extension at 50% (0.075 QALY) 
Scenario 3. End of life, palliative 
care (EoL-QoL), 6 months 
Life expectancy: 6 months 
Quality of life of 30% of normal health 
Life expectancy: 6 months 
Quality of life: 80% of normal health 
10% chance of 50% QoL 
improvement for 6 months 
(0.025 QALY)  
Scenario 4. End of life, palliative 
care (EoL-QoL), 18 months 
Life expectancy: 18 months 
Quality of life: 30% of normal health 
Life expectancy: 18 months 
Quality of life: 80% of normal health 
10% chance of 50% QoL 
improvement for 18 months 
(0.075 QALY) 
Scenario 5. Temporary health 
benefit (T-QoL), 6 months 
Life expectancy: not affected 
Quality of life: 30% of normal health 
during 6 months; then normal health. 
Life expectancy: not affected 
Quality of life: 80% of normal health 
during 6 months; then normal health. 
10% chance of 50% QoL 
improvement for 6 months 
(0.025 QALY) 
Scenario 5. Temporary health 
benefit (T-QoL), 18 months 
Life expectancy: not affected 
Quality of life: 30% of normal health 
during 18 months; then normal health. 
Life expectancy: not affected 
Quality of life: 80% of normal health 
during 18 months; then normal health. 
10% chance of 50% QoL 




















Table 2. Structure of the surveys 
Introduction 





T-QoL, 6 months 
(Scenario 5) 
T-QoL, 6 months 
(Scenario 5) 




T-QoL, 18 months 
(Scenario 6) 
T-QoL, 18 months 
(Scenario 6) 






T-QoL vs. EoL/LE, 
6 months 
(Scenarios 5 vs. 1) 
T-QoL vs. EoL-P, 
6 months 
(Scenarios 5 vs. 3) 
EoL-P vs. EoL/LE, 
6 months 
(Scenarios 3 vs. 1) 
Question 
4 
T-QoL vs. EoL/LE, 
18 months 
(Scenarios 6 vs. 2) 
T-QoL vs. EoL-P, 
18 months 
(Scenarios 6 vs. 4) 
EoL-P vs. EoL/LE, 
18 months 





EoL/LE, 6 months 
(Scenario 1) 
EoL-P, 6 months 
(Scenario 3) 




EoL/LE, 18 months 
(Scenario 2) 
EoL-P, 18 months 
(Scenario 4) 













Table 3. Socio-demographic characteristics of subjects 










Male/Female (%)  51/49 51/49 52/48 51/49  51/49 










Marital status (%)           
Married/Cohabiting  44.8 59,5 59.1 55.0  63.1 
Single/Divorced/Widow 55.2 40,5 40.9 45.0  36.9 
Education level (%)           
Illiterate/Primary  studies  37.7 31.0 49.1 40.6  30.1 
Secondary  studies  41.4 43.5 28.1 36.4  45.1 
University  studies  20.9 25.4 22.8 23.0  24.7 
Employment status (%)        
Employed  51.0 59.1 56.7 55.7  48.0 
Unemployed  17.2 11.2 15.8 14.9  12.0 
Inactive  31.8 29.7 27.5 29.4  40.0 
Income  level  (%)        
Up to €1,500  82.8  55.6  63.7  67.0  52.3 
€1,501-2,000  10.9 17.7 20.5 16.9  17.2 
€2.001-3,000 5.0  14.7  14.0  11.6  19.5 











Table 4. Willingness to Pay (WTP) data 
   6 months  18 months 
A  T-QoL  T-QoL  EoL/LE  T-QoL  T-QoL  EoL/LE 
B  EoL/LE  EoL-P  EoL-P  EoL/LE  EoL-P  EoL-P 
Mean WTP(A) (€)  371.1  499.8  976.9  556.6  858.0  1480.0 
Mean WTP(B) (€)  647.2  1247.3  1227.9  1239.1  2083.1  1786.9 
% WTP(A) > WTP(B)  23.4 11.2 27.2 19.2 12.1 26.9 
% WTP(A) = WTP(B)  19.7  14.7  28.7  14.6 9.1 33.3 
% WTP(A) < WTP(B)  56.9 74.1 44.2 66.2 78.8 39.8 
% WTP(A) = 0  11.3 6.5 17.3 6.7  1.3 15.5 
% WTP(B) = 0  23.0 12.5  6.4  12.6  6.5  9.1 
Mean ratio A>B  0.62  0.51  0.71  0.54  0.49  0.76 
Mean ratio B>A  0.80  0.91  0.86  0.85  0.92  0.89 
Ratio of means  1.29  1.78  1.22  1.57  1.86  1.17 
Median of ratios 
(B=1)  1.3  2.0  1.0  2.0  2.1  1.0 
Note: differences between mean WTP were always statistically significant at 











Table 5. Relative values from PTO 
  6 months  18 months 
A  T-QoL  T-QoL  EoL/LE  T-QoL  T-QoL  EoL/LE 
B  EoL/LE  EoL-P  EoL-P  EoL/LE  EoL-P  EoL-P 
%A>B  44.8 17.2 36.3 40.6 17.2 36.5 
%A<B  55.2 82.8 63.7 59.4 82.8 63.5 
Mean ratio A>B  0.57 0.26 0.65 0.52 0.26 0.66 
Mean ratio B>A  0.65 0.87 0.82 0.71 0.87 0.82 
Ratio of means  1.14 3.35 1.26 1.36 3.30 1.25 












Table 6. Comparison between WTP and PTO 
  6 months  18 months 
Chosen option 
WTP(A) vs. WTP(B)  WTP(A) vs. WTP(B) 
A<B  A=B  A>B  Total  A<B  A=B  A>B  Total 
A (T-Qo)  48  23 36  107  57  11 29 97 
B (EoL/LE)  88 24  20
  132 101  24  17  142 
Total  136 47 56  239  158  35 46  239 
A (T-Qo)  15  12 13 40 20  8 12  40 
B (EoL-P)  157 22 13  192 163  13  16  192 
Total  172 34 26  232  183  21 28  232 
A (EoL/LE)  45  33  46  124  40  39  46  125 
B (EoL-P)  106  65  47  218  96  75  46  217 
Total  151  98  93  342  136  114  92  342 














Let us assume that most subjects (say 80%) think that condition A is worse 
than condition B. Let us also assume that subjects apply the same preferences 
in WTP and PTO. That is, those who think that A is worse than B are willing to 
pay more to avoid A than to avoid B and choose patient A in PTO. However, 
let us also assume that preferences are noisy (stochastic). This can be 
justified because preferences are imprecise and the task is complicated. This 
implies that there is an element of error in responses. Finally, we will also 
assume that error is bigger in WTP than in PTO since people may find it more 
difficult to discriminate between options when they are evaluated separately 
rather than jointly.  In this example we will assume that the error rate in WTP 
is 25% and in PTO is 10%. 
 
We start by supposing that we have a group of 1000 subjects with the above 
(stochastic) preferences. As 800 think that condition A is worse than condition 
B, there is a majority of subjects who should pay more for A than for B and 
who should choose A in PTO. However, out of this 800 there are 200 (25%) 
who state that WTP(A)<WTP(B) and 600 rightly state that WTP(A)>WTP(B). Of 
those 600 there are 60 (10%) that make a mistake in PTO and then choose B. If 
we apply the same reasoning in all cases, we have the following groups: 
 
1000 subjects 
800 think that A is worse than B  200 think that B is worse than A 
600 say that 
WTP(A)>WTP(B) 
200 say that 
WTP(A)<WTP(B) 
50 say that 
WTP(A)>WTP(B) 













































These stochastic preferences would have produced the following table: 
 
 WTP(A)>WTP(B)  WTP(A)<WTP(B)  Total  Error rate in 
PTO 
Choose A in PTO  545  195  740  26% 
Choose B in PTO  105  155  260  40% 
Total 650  350     
Error rate in WTP  16%  56%     
 
So even if even if there is no discrepancy between individual and social 
values, the stochastic nature of preferences would produce a response 










1.  There is discrepancy between WTP and PTO. 
2.  Inconsistencies are asymmetric: they are bigger for the groups that are 
in the minority in both WTP and PTO.	
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